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Modern Stalking Laws:  A Survey of State 
Anti-Stalking Statutes Considering Modern 
Mediums and Constitutional Challenges 
Ashley N. B. Beagle* 
INTRODUCTION 
It began like any other dating relationship: John and Jane 
met through mutual friends on several occasions and then began 
to date.  However, after a few months, the dating relationship 
ended, and their relationship transformed into a stalking 
nightmare.  Immediately after the break-up, John began 
contacting Jane frequently and begging her to take him back.  
John called Jane’s cell phone, left her voice mail messages and 
text messages, and eventually left her messages on MySpace.1  
With his Blackberry,2 John had the ability to contact Jane at any 
time through its Internet and phone functions.  One message was 
remorseful and sensitive, filled with thoughts of longing, love, 
and eternal happiness, and the next was full of anger and 
jealousy because the relationship had ended and Jane had moved 
on.  Weeks turned into months, and months turned into years, as 
John continued with this behavior.  At points, John even 
contacted Jane’s friends and family members begging for her new 
address and questioning whether she had a new cell phone 
number because she refused to return his calls.  Almost two 
years later, Jane logged on to her MySpace account to find 
message after message from John begging her to take him back 
and marry him, to give him a current address, and to just call 
him so he could hear her voice again.  John had found Jane on 
MySpace and had written her messages for months.  Scared and 
 
* J.D. candidate 2011 Chapman University School of Law.  B.A. 2008 La Sierra 
University.  I would like to thank my family and friends for their faith, love, and 
encouragement, my husband for his never-ending support, my cousin for her inspiration, 
and all of the Chapman Law Review members whose hard work and effort went into this 
article. 
 1 “MySpace” is a “[s]ocial networking site that allows its users to create webpages to 
interact with other users.” MySpace, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM (Oct. 18, 2010), 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/Myspace.html. 
 2 A “Blackberry” is a “[m]obile smart device that combines a number of functions 
including emails, web browsing, text messaging, schedule management, and mobile phone 
into one portable handset.” Blackberry, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM (Oct. 18, 2010), 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/BlackBerry.html. 
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frustrated, Jane deleted her MySpace account in the hopes of 
finally erasing John from her life. 
While the names have been changed, the story is real and is 
becoming all too common as technology continues to increase and 
expand the ways in which stalkers can stalk and harass their 
victims.3  Each year, approximately 3.4 million people over the 
age of eighteen are stalked in the United States, according to the 
Supplemental Victimization Survey (SVS) of 2006.4  
Approximately twenty-five percent of victims reported being 
stalked through a medium such as e-mail or instant messaging, 
and more than half of all stalking and harassment victims 
reported being stalked by the telephone or through phone 
messages.5  While stalking is often analyzed and categorized by 
the type of stalker committing the unwanted behavior, the 
resulting harm to stalking victims spans a wide spectrum, 
leaving victims scared, traumatized, and depressed for years 
after stalking incidents.6 
This Comment analyzes current anti-stalking statutes in the 
United States as they apply to stalking that occurs through the 
mediums of the Internet and the telephone.  It focuses on the 
need to protect stalking victims by broad stalking legislation that 
can withstand constitutional challenges, and argues that existing 
statutes should be amended, or new statutes enacted, in order to 
cover all forms of stalking behavior.7  Part I provides an in-depth 
overview of stalking in the United States by describing the types 
of stalkers, typical stalker characteristics, methods of stalking, 
and effects on the victim.  Part I also addresses the history of 
anti-stalking law in the United States by detailing the law prior 
to the enactment of anti-stalking statutes and discussing general 
 
 3 This story is real and ongoing, with the last MySpace incident occurring about one 
and a half years prior to the date of this Comment.  The names have been changed for the 
purpose of respecting the involved parties’ privacy. 
 4 KATRINA BAUM ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: STALKING 
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2009). 
 5 Id.  Approximately 62.5% of all stalking and harassment victims reported phone 
stalking in the form of phone calls and messages. Id. at 2. 
 6 Joseph C. Merschman, The Dark Side of the Web: Cyberstalking and the Need for 
Contemporary Legislation, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 255, 261, 264–65 (2001).  “Thirty 
percent of female victims and twenty percent of male victims seek psychological 
counseling” as a result of stalking, and approximately twenty-five percent of stalking 
victims consider suicide. Id. at 265. 
 7 In discussing anti-stalking statutes in this Comment, “general anti-stalking 
statutes” refer to the initial anti-stalking statutes enacted to address stalking which focus 
on physical contact, and “specialized anti-stalking statutes” refer to statutes that address 
stalking by the mediums of the Internet and the telephone.  In analyzing specialized anti-
stalking statutes, this Comment addresses both stalking and harassment laws as they 
generally cover the same behavior as it relates to stalking through the mediums of the 
Internet and the phone, and “stalking” statutes will therefore include both stalking and 
harassment laws. 
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anti-stalking statutes and constitutional challenges to anti-
stalking statutes.  Part II analyzes current anti-stalking statutes 
as they relate to stalking through the mediums of the Internet 
and telephone and discusses continuing constitutional challenges 
to anti-stalking statutes.  Part III proposes amendments to 
existing laws so as to withstand constitutional scrutiny and 
encourage states to enact amendments to cover all forms of 
stalking in order to ensure that victims stalked through newer 
mediums are adequately and consistently protected. 
I.  HISTORY OF STALKING AND ANTI-STALKING STATUTES IN THE 
 UNITED STATES 
A. Overview of Stalking Behavior 
Stalking involves “repeated harassing or threatening 
behavior,” rather than an isolated instance of criminal conduct.8  
In California, for example, the crime of stalking is defined as 
“willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing] or willfully and 
maliciously harass[ing] another person and . . . [making] a 
credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable 
fear for his or her safety, or the safety or his or her immediate 
family.”9  Merely annoying, bothersome contact can develop into 
a serious, life-threatening situation.10  Stalking behavior is not 
limited to males or females, although stalkers are predominantly 
male and their victims are predominantly female.11  Stalkers’ 
motivations vary according to their typology, and include anger, 
jealously, revenge, delusion, fantasy, and an endeavor to win the 
victim’s affection.12 
 
 8 Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, A New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness 
of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 126 (2007).  See also Merschman, 
supra note 6, at 260 (noting that less than half of all stalking victims are directly 
threatened, and instead a stalker’s accumulated conduct creates reasonable fear in the 
minds of their victims). 
 9 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2010).  Compare ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90 
(LexisNexis 2005), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 18-9-111 (West 2009), and FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 784.048 (West 2008) (requiring a credible threat), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2923 
(West 2010), and TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072 (Vernon 2003) (rejecting a credible 
threat requirement). 
 10 Christine B. Gregson, California’s Antistalking Statute: The Pivotal Role of Intent, 
28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 221, 226 (1998).  The ultimate potential consequence of 
stalking is the victim’s death, and approximately 67% of homicides committed against 
women by their intimate partners involved prior stalking of the female victim by the male 
perpetrator. STALKING RESOURCE CTR., STALKING FACT SHEET (2009), 
http://www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_statistics195 (follow “Stalking Fact Sheet” 
hyperlink) [hereinafter STALKING FACT SHEET]. 
 11 According to the SVS, twenty out of one thousand females were likely to be 
stalking victims compared to approximately seven out of one thousand males. BAUM ET 
AL., supra note 4, at 3.  Additionally, “[f]emale victims of stalking were significantly more 
likely to be stalked by a male (67%) rather than a female (24%) offender.” Id. at 4. 
 12 Gregson, supra note 10, at 226; Merschman, supra note 6, at 260. 
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Stalkers can be divided into three main categories that 
describe their stalking relationship with their victim: 
erotomaniacs, love obsessional stalkers, and simple obsessional 
stalkers.13  An understanding of each type is necessary to 
formulate and assess effective anti-stalking legislation. 
1.  Stalker Types 
The first stalking category consists of individuals who have 
“erotomania,” known as “erotomaniacs.”14  Erotomaniacs have a 
delusional belief that their victim loves them and they view their 
victim as unattainable, such as the classic example of celebrity 
stalking.15  This stalker becomes obsessed with his or her victim 
and creates an imaginary relationship with the victim.16  The 
erotomaniac does not know his or her victim and rarely will 
initiate face-to-face contact.  Instead, this type of stalker uses 
less confrontational stalking methods, such as phone calls or 
letters; therefore, the erotomaniac is the least likely of the three 
stalker types to become violent.17  An erotomaniac is most often a 
socially immature individual who is unable to maintain close 
relationships.18  Unlike the other two types of stalkers, this 
stalker is more likely to be a female, and the majority of her 
victims are likely to be older men with a higher socioeconomic 
status.19  Overall, erotomaniacs compose only ten percent of all 
stalkers.20 
 
 13 Belinda Wiggins, Stalking Humans: Is There a Need for Federalization of Anti-
Stalking Laws in Order to Prevent Recidivism in Stalking?, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1067, 
1072–73 (2000). 
 14 Tatia Jordan, The Efficacy of the California Stalking Law: Surveying Its 
Evolution, Extracting Insights from Domestic Violence Cases, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 
363, 365 (1995); Merschman, supra note 6, at 263.  “Erotomania . . . is classified 
diagnostically as a delusional disorder, known as ‘de Clerambault’s syndrome.’” Joseph A. 
Davis & Marcella A. Chipman, Stalkers and Other Obsessional Types: A Review and 
Forensic Psychological Typology of Those Who Stalk, in STALKING CRIMES AND VICTIM 
PROTECTION: PREVENTION, INTERVENTION, THREAT ASSESSMENT, AND CASE MANAGEMENT 
3, 4 (Joseph A. Davis ed., 2001) (hereinafter STALKING CRIMES). 
 15 Davis & Chipman, supra note 14; Wiggins, supra note 13, at 1072. 
 16 Merschman, supra note 6, at 263. 
 17 Davis & Chipman, supra note 14, at 9.  The SVS reports that approximately 9.7% 
of stalking victims identified their stalker as a stranger. BAUM ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.  
See also Merschman, supra note 6, at 261 (“[T]he NVAW [National Violence Against 
Women] Survey [from 1998] found that only 23% of female victims reported being stalked 
by strangers . . . .”). 
 18 Merschman, supra note 6, at 263.  Additionally, this stalker tends to be older and 
more intelligent than other mentally ill persons who commit crimes. Id. 
 19 Wiggins, supra note 13, at 1072. 
 20 Id.  The case of Rebecca Schaeffer, see infra Part I.C, involved the case of an 
erotomaniac stalker.  See also Laurie Salame, A National Survey of Stalking Laws: A 
Legislative Trend Comes to the Aid of Domestic Violence Victims and Others, 27 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 67, 80–81 (1993). 
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The second type of stalker is labeled the “love obsessional” 
stalker.21  This stalker does not have a relationship with his or 
her victim; however, unlike erotomaniacs, he or she has usually 
had some sort of contact with the victim.22  The love obsessional 
stalker engages in a campaign to make his or her victim aware of 
the stalker’s existence.23  This stalker is often a well-educated, 
affluent professional whose personal life revolves solely around 
stalking the victim.24  Unlike the erotomaniac, the love 
obsessional stalker is not under a delusion that the victim loves 
him or her.25  Instead, the obsessional stalker is likely to suffer 
from a personality disorder such as schizophrenia.26  In 
contacting their victims, love obsessional stalkers are most likely 
to use mediums such as phone calls and letters.27  As with 
erotomania, celebrity stalkers often fall within the love 
obsessional typology.28 
The final category of stalkers is known as the “simple 
obsessional” stalker.29  The simple obsessional stalker tradition-
ally has had a previous relationship with his or her victim or 
“some previous knowledge” of his or her victim.30  The simple 
obsessional stalker usually becomes a stalker when prompted by 
a specific event, such as the ending of a relationship, or a 
perception of mistreatment by the victim.31  As a result of this 
 
 21 Wiggins, supra note 13, at 1072–73. 
 22 Id.; Davis & Chipman, supra note 14, at 5.  This contact could be a fleeting 
occasion such as at the bank or in the grocery store, or on a more regular basis such as a 
co-worker or neighbor. Id. at 10.  Approximately 45.1% of stalking victims know their 
stalker in a capacity such as a neighbor, co-worker, or acquaintance. BAUM ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 4. 
 23 Davis & Chipman, supra note 14, at 5. 
 24 Id. at 10.  A specific type of love obsessional stalker is known as the “workplace-
type stalker,” a “workaholic . . . who perceives proof of reciprocal interaction with the 
victim through innocuous circumstances.” Id.  A workplace stalker’s behavior is often 
overt rather than hidden and is observed by other co-workers. Id. at 11. 
 25  Jordan, supra note 14, at 365–66.  Unlike the love obsessional stalker who may 
have schizophrenia, the erotomaniac generally does not suffer from a mental condition 
other than the delusion that they are loved by their victim. Id.  
 26 Id.  “Schizophrenia is a serious mental illness characterized by incoherent or 
illogical thoughts, bizarre behavior and speech, and delusions or hallucinations such as 
hearing voices.” Schizophrenia, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (2009), http://www.apa.org/topics/ 
schiz/index.aspx. 
 27 Gregson, supra note 10, at 227. 
 28 Id. at 226; Wiggins, supra note 13, at 1072–73. 
 29 Jordan, supra note 14, at 366. 
 30 Id.; Wiggins, supra note 13, at 1072.  This relationship or knowledge can be that of 
co-workers, acquaintances or former intimate partners such as an ex-girlfriend or ex-wife. 
Id.  The SVS found that 30.3% of stalking victims either were or had been in an intimate 
relationship with their stalking offender. BAUM ET AL., supra note 4, at 4. 
 31 Davis & Chipman, supra note 14, at 5.  Because stalking laws criminalize 
otherwise constitutional conduct, there is some concern that a former partner’s behavior 
could be misinterpreted as stalking rather than as an innocent, harmless attempt to 
regain their partner’s love. See generally Kenneth R. Thomas, The Problem of the 
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event, the stalker seeks to “either restore the relationship or [to] 
seek retribution.”32  The stalker has usually preceded the 
stalking behavior with domestic violence or similar behavior, and 
during the stalking “mission,” he or she maintains an outwardly 
normal appearance.33  Simple obsessional stalkers are the most 
dangerous stalker type and the most likely to confront their 
victim in person and to physically harm their victim or their 
victim’s property.34  Accordingly, the simple obsessional victim is 
the most common and least protected type of victim.35 
2.  Typical Characteristics 
Stalkers in general, regardless of their typology, have certain 
characteristics in common, the existence of which is higher than 
among the average population.  Initially, people with 
“attachment difficulties and a history of failed relationships” are 
more likely to become stalkers.36  Additionally, persons with a 
history of violence, violent criminals, and persons who threaten 
former partners are also more likely to become stalkers.37  Most 
stalkers are also emotionally or mentally disturbed, and a 
majority of stalkers suffer from personality disorders such as 
histrionic, antisocial, or borderline personalities.38 
 
Persistent Suitor: Can Antistalking Laws Distinguish Between Love and Madness?, 41 
FED. B. NEWS & J. 620 (1994) (questioning whether stalking laws can effectively separate 
constitutional conduct from unconstitutional stalking).  However, stalking laws 
intentionally address otherwise constitutional conduct when that conduct reaches a 
certain level and then becomes criminal and is no longer entitled to constitutional 
protection. Merschman, supra note 6, at 272–73.  Additionally, many stalking laws 
include provisions that expressly exclude constitutional conduct.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE 
§ 13A-6-92 (LexisNexis 2005) (excluding constitutional conduct from conduct addressed by 
the statute). 
 32 Jordan, supra note 14, at 366. 
 33 Davis & Chipman, supra note 14, at 5.  “Many simple obsessional cases of stalking 
fall into the domestic violence realm where ex-spouses or ex-partners are stalking victims 
who are attempting to escape abusive relationships.” Jordan, supra note 14, at 366. 
 34 Gregson, supra note 10, at 228. 
 35 Davis & Chipman, supra note 14, at 5.  Simple obsessional stalking victims are 
the least protected victim because of the nature of their prior relationship with their 
stalker.  This victim often rationalizes and excuses the stalker’s behavior until the victim 
has been harmed. Id. 
 36 STEPHEN J. MOREWITZ, STALKING AND VIOLENCE: NEW PATTERNS OF TRAUMA AND 
OBSESSION 1 (2003).  Additional common “stalker” characteristics include “difficulty in 
establishing an identity, and a desire for attention.” Jennifer L. Bradfield, Anti-Stalking 
Laws: Do They Adequately Protect Stalking Victims?, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 235 
(1998). 
 37 MOREWITZ, supra note 36. 
 38 Bradfield, supra note 36; DETECTIVE MIKE PROCTOR, HOW TO STOP A STALKER 260 
(2003).  Histrionic personality disorder is a disorder where the afflicted person shows a 
continuing pattern of dramatic and attention-seeking behaviors. Histrionic Personality 
Disorder, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL DISORDERS, http://www.minddisorders.com/Flu-
Inv/Histrionic-personality-disorder.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).  Antisocial 
personality disorder is “a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of 
others.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
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3.  Stalking Methods 
In order to accomplish their stalking behavior, stalkers use a 
variety of mediums and methods.  This behavior can be passive, 
such as making unwanted phone calls to their victim’s home and 
work, stealing and reading their victim’s e-mail, calling their 
victim and hanging up repeatedly, and sending their victim 
unwanted photos and harassing messages.39  Bolder stalking 
behaviors include following a victim, spying on a victim or 
standing outside a victim’s home or work, vandalizing a victim’s 
property, and threatening to harm a victim, or a victim’s family 
or pets.40  The worst-case stalking scenario results in violence 
toward the victim, including rape, assault, and murder.41 
As technology continues to develop, stalkers are taking 
advantage of new mediums such as the Internet to stalk their 
victims.42  A relatively recent and growing form of stalking 
behavior occurs through electronic media and is known as 
“cyberstalking.”43  Cyberstalking is defined as stalking involving 
the “use of the Internet, e-mail, or other electronic communic-
ations devices to stalk another person,”44 and has effectively 
expanded the ways in which stalkers harass their victims.45  
Cyberstalkers have unique characteristics that distinguish them 
 
MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR 701 (2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV].  Borderline personality 
disorder is “a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, 
and affects, and marked impulsivity.” Id. at 706. 
 39 TK LOGAN ET AL., PARTNER STALKING: HOW WOMEN RESPOND, COPE, AND SURVIVE 
19 (2006). 
 40 Mary L. Boland, Model Code Revisited: Taking Aim at the High-Tech Stalker, 20 
CRIM. JUST. 40, 41 (2005). 
 41 Merschman, supra note 6, at 260. 
 42 Boland, supra note 40, at 41. 
 43 Id.  See also Ann Wolbert Burgess & Timothy Baker, Cyberstalking, in STALKING 
AND PSYCHOSEXUAL OBSESSION: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR PREVENTION, 
POLICING AND TREATMENT 201, 205–06 (Julian Boon & Lorraine Sheridan eds., 2002) 
(discussing cyberstalking in the collegiate context). 
 44 Amy C. Radosevich, Thwarting the Stalker: Are Anti-Stalking Measures Keeping 
Pace with Today’s Stalker?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1371, 1376 (2000). 
 45 Goodno, supra note 8, at 126.  Cyberstalkers can stalk their victim by using 
Internet search engines to locate and harass their victims and monitoring their victim’s 
activities through the use of browser history, interception of emails, and spyware. Cindy 
Southworth & Sarah Tucker, Technology, Stalking and Domestic Violence Victims, 76 
MISS. L.J. 667, 667–70 (2007).  Stalkers can also use “Keystroke Loggers” that record 
every key typed on a computer to monitor their victim and can set up websites to harass 
their victim or encourage others to do so. Id.  Additionally, stalkers can impersonate their 
victim as a further way to terrorize and harass the victim. Bonnie D. Lucks, Electronic 
Crime, Stalkers, and Stalking: Relentless Pursuit, Harassment, and Terror Online in 
Cyberspace, in STALKING CRIMES, supra note 14, at 161, 187.  As a consequence of the 
relative ease with which a cyberstalker may stalk their victim online as compared to a 
traditional stalker, a cyberstalker may consider their “online stalking” less harmful than 
more traditional methods. Joanna Lee Mishler, Cyberstalking: Can Communication Via 
the Internet Constitute a Credible Threat, and Should an Internet Service Provider be 
Liable If It Does?, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 115, 117 (2000). 
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from an ordinary stalker because of the Internet forum.46  
Cyberstalkers have the ability to instantly stalk and harass their 
victims by widely dispersing a stalking message, stalking from a 
further distance, concealing their own identity, stealing their 
victim’s identity, or stalking their victim through a third party.47 
In addition to stalking through the Internet, stalkers 
continue to use more traditional mediums of stalking, such as the 
phone, although supported by ever-increasing technological 
advances.48  Many stalkers use a telephone as their first weapon 
of choice to harass and threaten their victims because of the 
prevalence of phones and their low cost in comparison to other 
technologies.49  In addition to using telephones to make harass-
ing phone calls and leave threatening messages, stalkers can also 
trace their victim’s land line phone records to monitor their 
victim’s activities and whereabouts.50  Additionally, with the 
growth of caller ID and Global Positioning System (GPS) chips in 
phones that keep internal records of calls and the cell phone 
users’ location, stalkers can access their victim’s call-history and 
location to further monitor their victim.51  As a result of the 
prevalence of telephone stalking, many states have enacted 
criminal statutes that exclusively penalize telephone stalking or 
telephone harassment.52 
To further complicate matters, as technology increases and 
blurs distinctions between various mediums, stalkers can track 
and follow their victim’s activities using several mediums at 
once.53  An example is seen in the growth of handheld devices like 
the Blackberry that provide Internet access, allow instant text 
 
 46 Goodno, supra note 8, at 128–29. 
 47 Id. at 128–32.  Cyberstalkers can also terrorize their victim by sending viruses, 
spam, or e-mail bombs, or by flooding their victim’s Internet conversation. Kimberly 
Wingteung Seto, How Should Legislation Deal with Children as the Victims and 
Perpetrators of Cyberstalking?, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 67, 73 (2002).  See generally 
Gene Barton, Taking a Byte Out of Crime: E-mail Harassment and the Inefficacy of 
Existing Law, 70 WASH. L. REV. 465 (1995) (discussing stalking by means of e-mail 
harassment and the interrelation between anti-stalking laws and e-mail stalking).  See 
also Ellen Luu, Web-Assisted Suicide and the First Amendment, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
307, 320–21 (2009) (noting the potential for increased difficulty in the investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalking cases because of the ability of a stalker in one jurisdiction to 
stalk a victim in another jurisdiction over the Internet). 
 48 Southworth & Tucker, supra note 45, at 673. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 674.  State anti-stalking laws may specifically criminalize stalking by means 
of GPS devices. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.3 (West 2010) (defining 
“stalking” to include “plac[ing] a person under surveillance,” which is further defined as 
including “placing an electronic tracking device on the person or the person’s property”). 
 51 Southworth & Tucker, supra note 45, at 674. 
 52 See infra Part II.A. 
 53 Southworth & Tucker, supra note 45, at 675. 
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and e-mail messaging, and allow the user to send photos.54  
Essentially, a stalker could pursue his or her victim using both 
the Internet and the phone all at once, potentially complicating 
prosecution of the stalker’s behavior.55 
4.  Effects on the Victim 
While stalkers’ behavior varies depending on their 
relationship with the victim and the mediums and methods they 
use to stalk their victim, the victims generally suffer similar 
types of harm, which varies only by degree.  Stalking victims 
essentially have their privacy destroyed and, as a result, become 
paranoid and fearful.56  This fear can manifest itself in victims as 
a fear of others, a fear of new things, and a fear of falling 
asleep.57  As a result of this fear, victims may withdraw from 
their social world and find it hard to engage in their daily 
activities and maintain relationships.58  Victims can become 
intensely emotionally disturbed and their lives can be 
permanently altered, including losing their jobs and even being 
forced to move to a different location.59  “The prevalence of 
anxiety, insomnia, social dysfunction, and severe depression is 
much higher among stalking victims than the general 
population, especially if the stalking involves being followed or 
having one’s property destroyed.”60  A 1998 statistic indicated 
 
 54 Id.; see supra note 2.  Several states have modified their anti-stalking laws to 
include stalking by means of text messaging or instant messaging. See, e.g., NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 200.575 (LexisNexis 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.090 (West 2010); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (LexisNexis 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West 
2010) (addressing stalking or harassment by means of “text messaging”).  See also OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1172 (West 2009); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (Vernon 2003) 
(addressing stalking or harassment by means of “instant messaging”). 
 55 Southworth & Tucker, supra note 45, at 675.  A stalker’s use of a combined 
medium like the Blackberry could potentially complicate prosecution when the 
government must decide whether to pursue punishment under a cyberstalking statute or 
a phone-stalking statute in those states that have specific anti-stalking statutes. 
 56 Gregson, supra note 10, at 228. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Merschman, supra note 6, at 264–65.  Over fifty percent of stalking victims miss 
five or more work days because of their stalking, and one-in-seven stalking victims move 
because of the stalking. BAUM ET AL., supra note 4, at 6, 7. 
 60 STALKING FACT SHEET, supra note 10.  Stalking victims may suffer a variety of 
clinical mental disorders, in addition to depression and generalized anxiety disorder, 
including obsessive-compulsive disorder and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Radosevich, 
supra note 44, at 1372.  Depression is generally defined as the “feeling of dejection, 
gloominess, cheerlessness, joylessness, and unhappiness.” DSM-IV, supra note 38, at 788.  
Anxiety is defined as “an abnormal and overwhelming sense of apprehension and fear 
often marked by . . . physical symptoms [such] as tension, tremor, sweating, palpitation, 
and increased pulse rate.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (3d ed. 
1993).  Obsessive-compulsive disorder, or “OCD,” is a neurotic state characterized by 
“recurrent obsessions and compulsions.” DSM-IV, supra note 38, at 456–57.  Post-
traumatic stress disorder, or “PTSD,” involves “intense fear, helplessness, or horror” as 
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that between three and thirty-six percent of stalking victims 
suffer an assault or battery, and two percent of stalking victims 
are killed by their stalker.61  As a result of these serious effects, 
states have considered stalking a crime and enacted various 
statutes to punish stalking behavior.62 
B. The Law Prior to Anti-Stalking Statutes 
Prior to 1990, no criminal statutes dealt specifically with 
stalking, and the existing legal measures to combat stalking were 
severely limited and inadequate.63  Under certain previous laws, 
a stalker could not be legally arrested until he or she had 
physically harmed his or her victims,64 thereby inhibiting the 
ability to protect victims from injury.65  Additionally, some laws, 
such as California’s law prohibiting terrorist threats,66 had a 
heightened requirement that a victim must have been aware that 
the stalker’s threat would be fulfilled immediately in order for it 
be classified as a violation.67  This requirement effectively limited 
the ability of law enforcement to protect victims before an actual 
attack.68  Furthermore, even if a stalker’s threat was held to be 
sufficient for criminal prosecution, the sanctions were often mild, 
with some states treating harassment as a misdemeanor.69 
The statutes used in California to prosecute stalking 
behavior prior to 1990 included Penal Code sections 653m and 
422,70 which prohibited placing annoying and obscene phone calls 
and making terrorist threats, respectively.71  Both statutes “were 
designed to protect victims from specific instances of threatening 
or annoying activities,” rather than from a series of harassing 
acts.72  As these statutes did not specifically address cumulative 
 
well as “persistent reexperiencing of the traumatic event . . . resulting from the exposure 
to . . . extreme trauma.” DSM-IV, at 463. 
 61 Wiggins, supra note 13, at 1073. 
 62 See infra Part I.C. 
 63 Suzanne Cavanagh et al., Stalking: Recent Developments, in STALKING AND 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CURRENT ISSUES 11, 11–12 (L.G. Wang ed., 2004). 
 64 Id.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8(a)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring physical 
harm under a harassment statute, including “strik[ing], shov[ing], kick[ing], or otherwise 
touch[ing] a person or subject[ing] him or her to physical contact”).  See also Silvija A. 
Strikis, Stopping Stalking, 81 GEO L.J. 2771, 2774 n.21 (1993) (discussing physical 
contact requirements of laws prior to anti-stalking statutes). 
 65 MOREWITZ, supra note 36, at 59. 
 66 CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West 2010). 
 67 Id.; MOREWITZ, supra note 36, at 59. 
 68 MOREWITZ, supra note 36, at 59. 
 69 ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8(a) (LexisNexis 2005); MOREWITZ, supra note 36, at 59. 
 70 CAL. PENAL CODE § 422; CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (West 2010). 
 71 Gregson, supra note 10, at 231–32. 
 72 Id. at 233. 
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stalking behavior—a course of stalking conducted over time—
they were too narrow to sufficiently protect stalking victims.73 
In addition to criminal prosecution of stalking behavior, 
victims were able to obtain protective orders, such as a 
temporary restraining order, under limited circumstances.74  In 
order for a stalking victim to obtain a protective order in 
California, the victim had to prove that “the harassment would 
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional 
distress,” and that the victim had in fact suffered emotional 
distress.75  Without such concrete proof, a stalking victim was 
helpless.76 
Despite the limited legal remedies in place for a stalking 
victim, the members of the criminal legal community were 
hesitant to pursue criminal remedies for stalking.77  To begin 
with, law enforcement officers were hesitant to enforce the then-
existing laws which presumably resulted in fewer arrests.78  
Should a stalker actually be arrested, prosecutors were reluctant 
to charge the perpetrator in certain cases such as stalking within 
a domestic relationship.79  Of the cases that were actually 
prosecuted, judges proffered lighter penalties in stalking cases 
that involved wife battering.80  However, ultimately, stalking 
statutes were enacted in every state to deal with the insufficiency 
of existing statutes and to adequately protect stalking victims.81 
C. General State Stalking Statutes 
In 1990, California was the first state to enact an anti-
stalking statute that directly addressed the criminal prosecution 
of stalkers.82  California enacted this statute largely in response 
 
 73 Id. at 232–33.  Stalking generally consists of multiple acts or cumulative behavior, 
therefore a statute that fails to criminalize minor acts that accumulate over time will 
necessarily exclude some stalking behavior. See supra Part II.A. 
 74 Gregson, supra note 10, at 229–30.  A temporary restraining order is “a protective 
court order that prohibits a stalker from further harassing the victim.” Id.  Restraining 
orders provide limited protection for stalking victims because they apply only to certain 
victims, such as statutes limited only to spousal abuse, and even a victim who receives a 
restraining order against their stalker is not guaranteed protection. Bradfield, supra note 
36, at 236–39.  Ohio’s domestic abuse restraining order statute is an example of a statute 
that limits protection to “acts against a family or household member.” OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3113.31(A)(1) (West 2009); Bradfield, supra note 36, at 237 n.34. 
 75 Gregson, supra note 10, at 230. 
 76 Id. 
 77 MOREWITZ, supra note 36, at 59. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Salame, supra note 20, at 70. 
 82 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2010); Julie A. Finney, The Paradox of Actual 
Substantial Emotional Distress Within the Context of California’s Criminal Stalking Law, 
29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 345 (2002). 
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to the 1989 death of a famous television actress, Rebecca 
Schaeffer.83  Prior to her murder, Schaeffer had been stalked by 
Robert Bardo, an obsessed fan, for two years before he ultimately 
murdered her.84  Schaeffer’s death brought the need for adequate 
stalking legislation in California to the media’s attention, 
resulting in California’s anti-stalking statute.85  Following 
California’s lead, all fifty states had anti-stalking statutes in 
place by 1995.86 
Since California was the first to enact an anti-stalking 
statute, its statute became a model that other states followed in 
creating their own anti-stalking statutes.87  California’s statute 
consists of three elements: an act, a threat, and intent.88  The 
current statute reads as follows: 
(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or 
willfully and maliciously harasses another person and who makes a 
credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear 
for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family is 
guilty of the crime of stalking . . . .89 
Anti-stalking statutes in other states can be divided into 
three groups based on the combination of elements they have 
adopted from California’s statute.90  Some states require all three 
elements of California’s anti-stalking statute: an act, a threat, 
and intent.91  Another group of states requires either an act or a 
threat combined with the perpetrator’s intent.92  The third group 
of states requires an act and the perpetrator’s intent.93  The 
intent required to satisfy the anti-stalking statutes varies among 
the states, ranging from those states that require a general 
intent, such as Idaho and Illinois, to those that require a specific 
intent, such as Connecticut and Texas.94  Additionally, state 
 
 83 Finney, supra note 82, at 344–45.  While Schaeffer’s death was the primary 
impetus for California’s enactment of the first anti-stalking law, the stalking murders of 
four other California women around the same time received additional media attention 
and contributed to the situation. Id. 
 84 Bradfield, supra note 36, at 244; Cavanagh, supra note 63, at 12. 
 85 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2010); Jordan, supra note 14, at 367. 
 86 Merschman, supra note 6, at 266. 
 87 MOREWITZ, supra note 36, at 61. 
 88 Id. 
 89 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West 2010) (emphasis added). 
 90 MOREWITZ, supra note 36, at 61. 
 91 Id.  These states include Alabama and Arkansas. Id.  See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90 
(2005); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-71-229 (West 2009). 
 92 MOREWITZ, supra note 36, at 61.  The states requiring only two elements include 
Delaware and South Dakota. Id.  See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312 (2008); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-1 (2006). 
 93 MOREWITZ, supra note 36, at 61.  This grouping of states includes Connecticut and 
Idaho. Id.  See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-181c, 53a-181d (West 2007); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. §§ 18-7905, 18-7906 (2004). 
 94 MOREWITZ, supra note 36, at 62–63. 
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statutes can further be categorized by their levels of punishment 
and penalties for stalking behavior, varying in regard to the first 
offense and subsequent offenses in terms of misdemeanors and 
penalties.95 
D. Constitutional Challenges to Stalking Statutes 
With the advent of state anti-stalking laws came 
constitutional challenges from adversely-affected defendants.96  
The majority of the constitutional challenges to anti-stalking 
statutes fall into two groups: challenges to the statutes as being 
overbroad and challenges to the statutes as being un-
constitutionally vague.97  Challenges claiming stalking statutes 
are overbroad allege that the statutes penalize conduct that is 
constitutionally protected.98  Vagueness challenges allege that 
the stalking statutes are insufficient to place the public on notice 
of what conduct is illegal and that such laws can lead to 
arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement.99  While a few cases have 
held certain anti-stalking statutes unconstitutional, courts have 
generally upheld these laws.100 
Broadness challenges to anti-stalking statutes allege that 
they are overly broad because they criminalize behavior 
protected under the First Amendment, such as the right to 
exercise free speech.101   Statutes can survive broadness 
challenges if a limited but constitutional interpretation of the law 
is possible, or, more generally, if they do not seriously threaten 
 
 95 Id.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-181c, 53a-181d, 53a-181e (West 2007) 
(varying the punishments for stalking in the first, second, and third degree to a Class D 
felony, Class A misdemeanor, and Class B misdemeanor respectively); ALASKA STAT. 
§§ 11.41.260, 11.41.270 (2008) (varying the punishments for stalking in the first and 
second degree to a Class C felony and Class A misdemeanor respectively). 
 96 Merschman, supra note 6, at 271. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Suzanne L. Karbarz, The First Amendment Implications of Anti-Stalking Statutes, 
21 J. LEGIS. 333, 337 (1995).  See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 449 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. 1994) 
(upholding Georgia’s stalking law as not unconstitutionally overbroad, reasoning that “to 
the extent that the challenged statutes do proscribe communicative conduct, their 
restriction is clearly limited to a ‘knowing and willful’ course of harassment and 
intimidation”). 
 99 Salame, supra note 20, at 94. 
 100 MOREWITZ, supra note 36, at 64.  Compare State v. Bryan, 910 P.2d 212, 212 (Kan. 
1996) (holding a state stalking law unconstitutionally vague insofar as the statute used 
the terms “alarms,” “harasses,” and “annoys” without including definitions for such 
terms), with Bouters v. State, 659 So.2d 235, 238 (Fla. 1995) (upholding Florida’s stalking 
law as neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor overly vague because it applied only to 
criminal conduct and clearly defined the term “harasses”), and People v. Bailey, 657 
N.E.2d 953, 961–63 (Ill. 1995) (upholding Illinois’ stalking law as not unconstitutionally 
vague or overbroad because the term “follow” was not vague and the statute did not 
infringe upon the defendant’s freedom of speech). 
 101 Jordan, supra note 14, at 374–75. 
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constitutionally protected conduct.102  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that “a government may criminalize true threats 
without violating the First Amendment’s protections against 
overly broad statutes.”103  Therefore, since most stalking behavior 
can be interpreted as creating a violent threat, this conduct may 
be penalized under anti-stalking statutes consistent with the 
Constitution.104 
The second type of constitutional challenge to state anti-
stalking statutes involves claims that the statutes are overly 
vague.  To comply with the Due Process Clause, a penal statute 
must “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and 
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.”105 Ultimately, statutes must 
sufficiently put people on notice of what conduct is prohibited.  
“However, this requirement ‘does not preclude the use of 
ordinary terms’ in the statute, as long as the terms have a 
common usage and understanding.”106 
While many defendants have brought vagueness challenges, 
courts have generally upheld anti-stalking statutes.107  Bouters v. 
State is an example of a vagueness challenge that failed.108  In 
Bouters, the defendant was prosecuted for terrorizing his ex-
girlfriend under Florida’s anti-stalking statute, which prohibited 
harassment, and the defendant challenged the statute’s use of 
the term “harasses” as unconstitutionally vague.109  The Florida 
Supreme Court held that the statute was not “impermissibly 
vague”—and therefore was constitutional—because the statutory 
use of “harasses” did not create a subjective standard, but rather 
created a “reasonable person” standard.110 
 
 102 MOREWITZ, supra note 36, at 64–65. 
 103 Merschman, supra note 6, at 272 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 
(1969)). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Merschman, supra note 6, at 273 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 
(1983)). 
 106 Gregson, supra note 10, at 241 (quoting People v. Heilman, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 
427 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 107 Merschman, supra note 6, at 274.  See, e.g., State v. Whitesell, 13 P.3d 887, 900 
(Kan. 2000) (upholding Kansas’ stalking statute as not unconstitutionally vague);; People 
v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28, 41 (N.Y. 2003) (upholding New York’s stalking statute as not 
unconstitutionally vague); Luplow v. State, 897 P.2d 463, 464, 472 (Wyo. 1995) (upholding 
Wyoming’s stalking statute as not unconstitutionally vague). 
 108 See generally Bouters v. State, 659 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1995). 
 109 Id. at 236, 238.  “Under the [Florida] statute, ‘[h]arasses’ means ‘to engage in a 
course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress 
in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.’” Id. at 238.  See also FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 784.048(1)(a) (West 2008). 
 110 Bouters, 659 So.2d at 238 (citing Pallas v. State, 636 So.2d 1358, 1361 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1994)).  Additionally, states that have modeled their anti-stalking statute 
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Ultimately, statutes with adequate definitions of prohibited 
conduct and objective (i.e., reasonable person) standards are 
more likely to withstand vagueness challenges, and statutes that 
exclude constitutional conduct are more likely to withstand 
broadness challenges. 
II.  SPECIALIZED ANTI-STALKING STATUTES AND LINGERING 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
As stalking became more prevalent and new mediums, such 
as the Blackberry, surfaced, state law evolved to create statutes 
that specifically addressed the newer forms of stalking and 
interpreted older, general stalking statutes to cover this behavior 
as well.111  Anti-stalking statutes can be divided into three main 
categories based on how they address cyberstalking and stalking 
by use of a telephone: (1) states that have enacted new anti-
stalking statutes to deal with changing mediums,112 (2) states 
that have amended and modified existing anti-stalking statutes 
to incorporate newer mediums,113 and (3) states that have 
general anti-stalking statutes that do not specifically discuss the 
newer mediums of stalking.114  Throughout the addition and 
amendment process, state anti-stalking statutes have continued 
to face constitutional challenges on vagueness and overbreadth 
grounds.115 A court’s holding that a stalking statute is 
unconstitutional renders uncertain the legal basis for any 
stalking cases prosecuted after such a finding until a subsequent 
statutory amendment can be passed, and thereby leaves stalking 
victims unprotected in the meantime. 
A. Specific Anti-Stalking Statutes 
Specific Anti-Stalking statutes are statutes that states have 
created to directly address stalking by a specific medium.  This 
may be accomplished through enactment of a new statute or 
amendment of an existing statute in order to encompass stalking 
 
language after the federal laws and define “harassment” according to the federal 
definition have also survived constitutional challenges on vagueness grounds. MOREWITZ, 
supra note 36, at 68.  Federal law defines “harassment” as “a course of conduct that 
causes the victim to experience substantial emotional distress.” Id.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 784.048(1)(a) (West 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90(a)(1) (2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 21, § 1173(F)(1) (West 2002) (defining harassment to include a “course of conduct” and 
“emotional distress”). 
 111 Statutes criminalizing stalking behavior through both traditional mediums and 
newer mediums such as the Internet can be found in stalking and harassment statutes. 
See supra note 7. 
 112 See infra Part II.A.1. 
 113 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 114 See infra Part II.B. 
 115 See infra Part II.C. 
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through the newer medium.116  These statutes are comprised of 
those that address telephone stalking, and those that address 
cyberstalking—that is, stalking by means of the Internet.  
Approximately one-third of all states have anti-stalking statutes 
that specifically address cyberstalking.117  The majority of the 
remaining states have amended their general anti-stalking 
statutes to cover stalking by electronic means or the Internet.118  
Additionally, many states have anti-stalking statutes that 
address stalking or harassment by use of the telephone.119  
However, some state statutes address substantially more conduct 
and mediums than others, and consequently appear to provide 
more complete protection for victims stalked by various electronic 
and telephone mediums, such as the Blackberry.120 
1.  New Statutes 
As stalkers increasingly began to use new technologies such 
as the Internet to stalk their victims, some states chose to 
address the issue of cyberstalking head-on by specifically 
enacting statutes that covered cyberstalking in addition to their 
existing general anti-stalking statutes.121  The creation of 
 
 116 Goodno, supra note 8, at 141, 144. 
 117 Mike Harris, Cyberstalking Case Linked to State Law from 1990: Expert Finds 
Little Similarity with L.A. Cyberbullying Trial, VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Jan. 4, 2009), 
http://www.vcstar.com/news/2009/jan/04/cyberstalking-case-linked-to-state-law-from-
1990/. 
 118 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 119 See infra Part II.A.1, 2. 
 120 See infra Part II.A.1. 
 121 Goodno, supra note 8, at 144 (noting that as of 2007, six states had created new 
“cyberstalking” statutes that specifically and solely address cyberstalking: Illinois, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Rhode Island and Washington).  See 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.3 (2007); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 97-45-15 (West 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West 2010).  Other states 
have enacted new laws or amended existing statutes to essentially become new laws that 
address stalking through the Internet, electronic means, and electronic communication, 
including: Arkansas, California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108 (2006) (penalizing “[u]nlawful computerized 
communications”);; CAL. PENAL CODE § 653.2 (West 2010) (addressing “electronic 
communication device[s]”);; CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (West 2010) (criminalizing “contact 
by electronic communication device” with “intent to annoy,” and created by amending a 
telephone statute to become a telephone and electronic communication statute); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 135/1-2 (West 2009) (addressing “[h]arassment through electronic 
communications,” and created by amending statute to become an electronic 
communications harassment statute); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805 (LexisNexis 
2002) (addressing the “[m]isuse of electronic mail”);; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411s 
(West 2004) (including “posting messages through electronic medium[s]”);; MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 97-29-45 (West 2008) (addressing “[o]bscene electronic and telecommunications,” 
created by amending statute to become an “electronic and telecommunications” statute);; 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2009) (discussing “[p]rivacy in communications” and 
including “electronic communication[s],” and created by amending statute to focus on 
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additional anti-stalking statutes by these states indicates 
legislative recognition that existing general anti-stalking 
statutes are insufficient to address the problem of 
cyberstalking.122  The state of Washington provides a good 
example of a state’s decision to enact a new statute despite the 
fact that an existing statute could have been used to prosecute 
cyberstalking.123  Although Washington’s general statute 
included electronic communications, the Washington legislature 
felt the need was sufficiently great to enact a new statute that 
specifically addressed cyberstalking.124 
As with statutes addressing cyberstalking, states enacted 
similar laws to address stalking by means of the telephone.125  
 
electronic communications); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1172 (West 2008) (penalizing 
“[o]bscene, threatening or harassing telecommunication or other electronic 
communications,” and created by amending phone calls statute); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 49-31-31 (2009) (criminalizing “[t]hreatening or harassing contacts by telephone or other 
electronic communication device,” and created by amending telecommunications statute); 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (Vernon 2010) (addressing “[o]nline harassment”);; UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-9-201 (2010) (criminalizing “[e]lectronic communication harassment,” and 
created by amending phone statute); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1027 (2009) (penalizing 
“[d]isturbing the peace by use of telephone or other electronic communications,” and 
created by amending phone statute); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1 (2009) (punishing 
“[h]arassment by computer”);; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-14a (LexisNexis 2005) 
(discussing “[o]bscene, anonymous, harassing and threatening communications by 
computer”);; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 947.0125 (West 2005) (criminalizing the “[u]nlawful use of 
computerized communication systems”). 
 122 Goodno, supra note 8, at 144. 
 123 Id.  Washington’s general anti-stalking statute penalizes conduct that an 
individual “[k]nows or reasonably should know that the person is afraid, intimidated, or 
harassed, even if the stalker did not intend to place the person in fear or intimidate or 
harass the person.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(1)(c)(ii) (West 2009); Goodno, 
supra note 8, at 144.  The statute then includes “electronic communication” within its 
definition of criminal “contact.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(4) (West 2009). 
 124 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West 2010); Goodno, supra note 8, at 144.  
Additional states have enacted new statutes to address cyberstalking or stalking by 
means of the Internet or electronic communication although their existing general anti-
stalking statutes had been amended to incorporate such conduct, including: California, 
Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2010); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.3 (West 2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.4 (West 2002); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.411h, 750.411i (West 
2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-277.3A (LexisNexis 
2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173 (West 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-1 
(2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 
(2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1061 (2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.32 (West 2009). 
 125 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (West 2010) (addressing “[t]elephone calls or 
contact by electronic communication device with intent to annoy”);; MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
29-45 (West 2008) (penalizing “[o]bscene electronic and telecommunications”).  Specialized 
statutes that were created to address stalking or harassment by means of the telephone 
include: harassing communications statutes, phone harassment statutes, phone misuse 
statutes, and criminal threats statutes. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-71-209 (2005) 
(“[h]arassing communications” statute);; KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-4113 (West 2008) 
(“[h]arassment by telephone” statute);; CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West 2010) (“[c]riminal 
threats” statute that includes “cellular telephones” and “telephones” within its definition 
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Unlike cyberstalking laws however, many telephone harassment 
laws pre-date the first anti-stalking law of 1990.126  As technology 
increased and expanded, states even extended stalking or 
harassment statutes to incorporate text messaging.127  Some 
states expanded the definitions of stalking to include harassment 
by “electronic communication” that appear to encompass a wider 
range of mediums, including mediums such as the Blackberry or 
the iPhone.128 
2.  Amended Statutes 
A second group of states amended existing general anti-
stalking statutes to incorporate cyberstalking or stalking by 
electronic means.129  The majority of state anti-stalking statutes 
 
of “electronic communication device”);; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-804 (LexisNexis 
2002) (“[m]isuse of telephone facilities and equipment” statute). 
 126 Bradfield, supra note 36, at 240–41.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 365.16 (West 
1999) (first enacted in 1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6710 (2004) (first enacted in 1980); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.21 (West 2006) (first enacted in 1972). 
 127 See supra note 54. 
 128 Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 2008), with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21, § 1172 (West 2008), and OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.065 (West 2010). 
 129 Goodno, supra note 8, at 145.  States that amended their general statutes to cover 
stalking or harassment by electronic means or cyberstalking include: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8 (LexisNexis 2005) (amending “[h]arassing 
communications” to include “electronic communication”);; ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.260, 
11.41.270, 11.61.120 (2008) (including “electronic communications”);; ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 13-2921, 13-2921.01 (2010) (including electronic means); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 646.9 (Deering 2008) (including “electronic communication device”);; CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 422 (Deering 2008) (including “electronic communication device”);; COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 18-9-111 (West 2004) (including a “computer”);; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-
182b, 53a-183 (West 2007) (including a “computer network”);; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§§ 1311, 1312 (2008) (including “telephone” communication and “by any action, method, 
device or means” respectively);; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2008) (including 
“cyberstalk[ing]”);; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90 (2007) (including a “computer,” “computer 
network,” and an “electronic device”);; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 711-1106, 711-1106.4, 
711-1106.5 (LexisNexis 2009) (including “electronic communication”);; IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§§ 18-7905, 18-7906 (2004) (including “electronic communications”);; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/12-7.3, 5/12-7.4 (West 2010) (including “electronic communications”);; IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-45-2-2 (West 2004) (including a “computer network” and “electronic 
communication”);; IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.7 (West 2003) (including “electronic 
communication”);; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3438 (West 2008) (including “electronic means”);; 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.130-508.150 (West 2009) (including by “computer,” “Internet,” 
and “electronic network”);; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (2009) (including “electronic 
mail”);; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-A (2009) (including “electronic means”);; MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, §§ 43, 43A (West 2008) (including “electronic mail”);; MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.411h, 750.411i (West 2004) (including “electronic 
communications”);; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749 (West 2009) (including electronic means); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 (West 2009) (including “by any means”);; MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 565.090 (West 2009) (including “electronic communication”);; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
220 (2009) (including “any other action, device, or method”);; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
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fall into this category.130  States have amended their statutes to 
incorporate cyberstalking or stalking by means of electronic 
communication in several different ways.131  States incorporated 
cyberstalking into their general statutes by either amending 
statutes to include “cyberstalk[ing],”132 or stalking by “electronic 
communications.”133  “Electronic communications” are defined as 
communications using either a general “electronic comm-
unication device” or by specific mediums such as “electronic 
mail,” “computer,” or “computer network.”134  Additionally, states 
amended their general statutes to cover cyberstalking behavior 
by punishing stalking with phrases such as any “method,” 
“means,” “medium,” or “device.”135 
California is an example of a state law that was amended to 
incorporate cyberstalking or stalking by electronic means.136  
California’s general anti-stalking statute was amended by 
chapters 825 and 826 in 1998 to address credible threats or 
harassment made with electronic communications to a victim 
 
§ 200.575 (West 2009) (including “Internet” and “electronic mail”);; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 633:3-a (LexisNexis 2007) (including electronic and computer communication); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4 (LexisNexis 2007) (including electronic and computer 
communication); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10 (West 2009) (including “by any action, 
method, means, or device”);; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3A-3, 30-3A-3.1 (West 2009) (including 
“by any action, method, device, or means”);; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 2008) 
(including by “electronic means”);; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3A (2008) (including 
“electronic transmissions”);; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07 (2009) (including electronic 
communication or transmission); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211 (West 2009) (including 
“electronic method”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173 (West 2002) (including “electronic 
communications”);; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.730 (West 2010) (including “electronic 
communication”);; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.065 (West 2010) (including “electronic 
threat”);; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2709, 2709.1 (West 2009) (including “electronic 
means”);; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700 (2008) (including “electronic contact”);; S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-1 (2006) (including electronic communication); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-17-315 (2006) (including “electronic communications”);; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-308 
(2006) (including “electronic communication”);; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West 2003) 
(including “electronic communication”);; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (West 2008) 
(including by “any action, method, device, or means”);; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1061, 
1062, 1063 (2009) (including “electronically communicated threats”);; WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West 2009) (including “electronic communication”);; WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 10.14.020 (West 2002) (including “electronic communication”);; WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 940.32 (West 2009) (including “electronic means”);; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (2009) 
(including electronic means).  Some of the states that amended their general statutes also 
enacted new statutes. See supra note 124. 
 130 Goodno, supra note 8, at 141. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2008). 
 133  Goodno, supra note 8, at 141. 
 134 Id. States adopting this method of amendment include: California, Georgia, 
Hawaii, and New York. Id. at 141 n.99, 142 n.100.  See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 
(Deering 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 711-1106, 711-1106.5 
(LexisNexis 2009); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 2008). 
 135 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-A (2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 
(West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10 (West 2005). 
 136 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (West 2008). 
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over the Internet.137  The California statute now states that a 
“‘credible threat’ means a verbal or written threat, including that 
performed through the use of an electronic communication 
device, or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a 
combination of verbal, written, or electronically communicated 
statements and conduct . . . .”138 
Although many states already had statutes in place to deal 
with harassing telephone calls and other threatening conduct by 
means of the telephone,139 some states amended their general 
stalking or general harassment statutes to cover stalking by 
means of the telephone or initially created stalking statutes to 
incorporate such behavior.140  Such amendments to include 
stalking by means of the telephone are particularly important 
because of the high percentage of stalking victims that report 
being stalked through phone calls and voice mail messages.141 
B. General, Un-Amended Anti-Stalking Statutes 
The third and final category consists of general anti-stalking 
statutes that have not been amended to include electronic 
communication but that may be subject to a judicial inter-
pretation that they cover cyberstalking.142  Crimes committed in 
 
 137 Lisa A. Karczewski, Stalking in Cyberspace: The Expansion of California’s Current 
Anti-Stalking Laws in the Age of the Internet, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 517, 521 n.40 (1999) 
(noting that chapters 825 and 826 amended Cal. Penal Code sections 422, 646.9, 653m).  
“Chapters 825 and 826 provide that an offense committed through the medium of an 
electronic communication device is deemed to have been committed where the 
communication was initially sent or first viewed by the other party.” Id. at 521.  See also 
1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. 825 (West). 
 138 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (West 2008). 
 139 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 140 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90(a)(1) (West 2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
7906(c)(v) (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3438 (2008).  Additionally, some states amended 
their general statutes to include “electronic communications” with expansive definitions of 
“electronic communications” that include the telephone. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 646.9(g), (h) (West 2008) (amending general stalking statute to include “electronic 
communications” that defines “electronic communication device” as including “telephones” 
and “cellular phones”). 
 141 See supra Part I. 
 142 Goodno, supra note 8, at 141.  Note that some states have amended a harassment 
statute to incorporate stalking by electronic means instead of amending a stalking 
statute, however, this final category is composed of states that have neither amended a 
harassment statute nor a stalking statute.  Nebraska is currently the only state that 
appears to fall into this category.  Nebraska has neither a specialized anti-stalking 
statute covering stalking by electronic communication nor has it amended its general 
anti-stalking statute to cover stalking by electronic communication. See NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 28-311.03 (LexisNexis 2006). According to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, three states that do not have statutes that cover cyberstalking behavior are 
Kentucky, Nebraska, and New Mexico. State Electronic Harassment or “Cyberstalking” 
Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 21, 2009), 
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/Cybersta
lkingLaws/tabid/13495/Default.aspx.  However, Kentucky’s stalking definition statute 
Do Not Delete 3/16/2011 5:25 PM 
2011] Survey of State Anti-Stalking Statutes 477 
these states may be punishable under the general anti-stalking 
statute or a telephone anti-stalking statute if the crime involves 
use of the Internet or a telephone.143  These states and their 
corresponding general anti-stalking statutes are the most ill-
equipped to deal with cyberstalking because it is not clear 
whether their general anti-stalking statutes cover any form of 
cyberstalking or whether telephone anti-stalking statutes might 
cover cyberstalking.144 
C. Constitutional Challenges to Specialized Anti-Stalking 
Statutes and the Case of Scott v. State 
While specialized anti-stalking statutes are significant 
improvements over the original stalking statutes in that they 
cover more stalking behavior and therefore provide more 
protection for stalking victims, these specialized statutes remain 
open to vagueness and overbreadth challenges.145  Specialized 
anti-stalking statutes continue to use flawed, weak language and 
are being challenged for failing to sufficiently define terms and 
for excluding constitutional conduct from within the statute’s 
scope.146  Without a constitutional law defining stalking or 
harassment offenses by use of newer mediums, the status of 
victims subjected to stalking through the use of these newer 
mediums remains unclear. 
 
includes within its “course of conduct” description, the “use of any equipment, instrument, 
machine, or other device by which communication or information is transmitted, 
including computers, the Internet or other electronic network . . . .” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 508.130(2) (West 2009).  Therefore, it appears that Kentucky’s general stalking statutes 
include stalking by means of electronic communication. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.140–
508.150 (West 2009).  Similarly, New Mexico’s general stalking statute was recently 
rewritten in 2009 to include stalking by “any action, method, device or means,” and 
therefore New Mexico’s statute appears to cover stalking by means of electronic 
communication. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3A-3(B)(2) (2009). 
 143 Goodno, supra note 8, at 141.  Note that statutes that do not directly address 
stalking by means of the telephone may not cover all stalking incidents by means of the 
telephone.  For example, Rhode Island’s general stalking law prohibits “harassment,” and 
“harasses” is defined as 
a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person with the 
intent to seriously alarm, annoy, or bother the person, and which serves no 
legitimate purpose.  The course of conduct must be such as would cause a 
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, or be in fear of 
bodily injury. 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-59-1(2) (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-59-2(a)(1) (2002) (providing that 
stalking law does not address stalking by specific mediums).  See also R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 11-52-4.2 (2008) (noting that cyberstalking law refers only to “electronic device” and 
does not directly include stalking by the telephone).  A court could find that repeated 
phone calls or voice messages do not constitute a “course of conduct” or an “electronic 
device” and therefore would not be covered by the statutes. 
 144 Goodno, supra note 8, at 141. 
 145 See infra note 161. 
 146 Id. 
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An example of a recent challenge to an anti-stalking statute 
is Scott v. State.147  In Scott, the defendant was convicted of 
harassing his former wife under a state harassment statute, and 
the defendant challenged the statute as overbroad and 
unconstitutionally vague.148  The defendant’s harassing behavior 
consisted of making repeated telephone calls to his former wife 
and leaving her “abusive and harassing voice mail messages.”149  
The defendant was charged under two sections of Texas’ 
harassment statute.150  The relevant parts of the statute are as 
follows: 
(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to harass, annoy, 
alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another, he: 
. . .  
(4) causes the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or makes 
repeated telephone communications anonymously or in a manner 
reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, 
or offend another; . . . [or] 
. . .  
(7) sends repeated electronic communications in a manner reasonably 
likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend 
another.151 
In challenging the constitutionality of the statute, the 
defendant alleged that the phrase “in a manner reasonably likely 
to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend 
another” was unconstitutionally vague because “[i]t is impossible 
for a citizen to know what, in the disjunctive, is meant by this 
statute’s series of vague terms.”152  The defendant also noted the 
lack of an objective standard.153  Furthermore, the defendant 
alleged that the statute’s prohibition of “repeated” comm-
unications was unconstitutionally vague because the statute 
 
 147 See generally Scott v. State 298 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009). 
 148 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West 2003); Scott, 298 S.W.3d at 267. 
 149 Scott, 298 S.W.3d at 266. 
 150 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(4), (7); Scott, 298 S.W.3d at 266.  Texas’ stalking 
statute is in the amended category. See supra note 129. 
 151 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(4), (7).  The statute goes on to define “electronic 
communication” as 
a transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any 
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectronic, or photo-optical system.  The term includes: (A) a 
communication initiated by electronic mail, instant message, network call, or 
facsimile machine; and (B) a communication made to a pager. 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(b)(1)(A), (B).  The Scott court then found that voice mail 
messages were included within “electronic communications.” Scott, 298 S.W.3d at 267. 
 152 Scott, 298 S.W.3d at 267. 
 153 Id. at 270. 
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failed to define the number of communications that constituted 
“repeated.”154 
The Scott court first found that First Amendment freedoms 
were implicated under the statute, then went on to hold that the 
phrase “in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, 
abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another” was un-
constitutionally vague on its face.155  The Scott court further held 
that the phrase “repeated” was unconstitutionally vague because 
it could technically encompass “three phone calls over ten 
years.”156  Therefore, the court acquitted the defendant and held 
sections (a)(4) and (a)(7) of the statute unconstitutional.157 
Currently, there is no pending legislation to amend the 
statutory sections found unconstitutional by the Scott court’s 
holding on June 24, 2009.158  The general stalking statute in 
Texas does not directly cover stalking by means of electronic 
communication or the telephone, and therefore the harassment 
statute held unconstitutional by Scott was likely the primary 
means to prosecute stalking or harassing behavior committed 
through these means.159  On September 1, 2009, a new Texas 
statute governing “Online Harassment” became effective; 
however, the online harassment statute does not appear to cover 
the full range of activities prohibited under the general 
harassment statute.160  Therefore, the current state of Texas 
stalking and harassment law, as well as that of certain stalking 
victims, is uncertain.161  Consequently, statutory change is 
needed in order to ensure that all stalking victims are protected. 
 
 154 Id. at 267. 
 155 Id. at 269, 273. 
 156 Id. at 273. 
 157 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(4), (7); Scott, 298 S.W.3d at 273. 
 158 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(4), (7). 
 159 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072 (West 2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07. 
 160 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (West 2003). 
 161 In states that have not enacted new specialized anti-stalking provisions but that 
have amended general statutes to incorporate stalking by electronic means or the phone, 
holding the general statute unconstitutional would potentially harm victims stalked by 
electronic means or the telephone since there would be no other statute governing such 
behavior.  For example, Texas’s general stalking law does not include stalking by 
electronic means or the telephone, so holding the harassment statute that covered such 
stalking methods unconstitutional may leave victims stalked by these methods 
unprotected, excluding the online harassment statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 42.072; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07.  In addition to 
Texas, several other states have pending constitutional anti-stalking statute problems 
including Utah and New Hampshire.  In Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, a “repeated calls” 
provision of Utah’s electronic communication harassment statute similar to that in Scott 
v. State was challenged as overly broad. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-201 (LexisNexis 2008); 
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 86 P.3d 735, 740 (Utah 2004).  The Utah Supreme Court 
refused to reach the constitutionality of the provision because they found that the 
defendant lacked standing to bring an overbreadth challenge. Provo City Corp., 86 P.3d at 
741.  Although Utah has amended the statute since 2004, the word “repeated” remains 
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III.  FURTHER STATUTORY AMENDMENT IS NEEDED TO 
ADEQUATELY COVER STALKING BY ELECTRONIC MEANS AND THE 
TELEPHONE AND TO ENSURE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-
STALKING STATUTES 
In order to provide the best, most complete protection for 
stalking victims, statutes must cover a broad range of stalking 
behavior but exclude otherwise constitutional conduct.  While the 
majority of states have enacted new statutes or amended existing 
statutes to cover stalking by means of the phone or the 
Internet,162 at least one state does not have a stalking statute 
that directly addresses stalking by electronic means, and at least 
one state has a stalking law that fails to address stalking by 
means of the telephone.163  Other states have stalking laws in 
place that have been held unconstitutional or could be found 
unconstitutional.164 
Therefore, states with general, un-amended anti-stalking 
statutes—Nebraska, and potentially Kentucky and New 
Mexico—should either amend their general stalking statutes to 
include stalking by electronic means or cyberstalking, or 
alternatively, enact new statutes that specifically encompass 
such stalking behavior.165  Additionally, there are states with 
general anti-stalking statutes that have not been amended to 
include stalking by means of the telephone, as well as states that 
have not enacted new statutes to cover such behavior.166  
Furthermore, as technology continues to increase and 
consequently expand the means in which stalkers may stalk 
their victims, states should continue to amend their statutes 
proactively to encompass new behaviors and mediums such as 
text messaging and stalking through use of a Blackberry or an 
iPhone.167 
 
undefined. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-201.  In State v. Pierce, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court found the state’s harassment statute unconstitutionally overbroad under the state’s 
constitution. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4(I)(f) (LexisNexis 1996); State v. Pierce, 887 
A.2d 132, 135 (N.H. 2005).  Although the New Hampshire statute has been amended since 
2005, the overbreadth issue appears to remain uncorrected. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4. 
 162 See supra Part II.A. 
 163 See supra Part II.B (detailing three states without cyberstalking statutes: 
Kentucky, Nebraska, and New Mexico).  See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (2008) 
(showing that Rhode Island’s anti-stalking statute does not include stalking by 
telephone). 
 164 See supra note 161. 
 165 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 166 One of those states is Rhode Island. See supra note 143. 
 167 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575 (LexisNexis 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 166.090 (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (LexisNexis 2008); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West 2010) (addressing stalking or harassment by means of “text 
messaging”).  See also N.Y. PENAL § 240.30 (McKinney 2008) (covering a broad range of 
mediums in its harassment statute including, “causes a communication to be initiated by 
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States that have stalking statutes that address stalking via 
newer mediums but that have been found unconstitutional, or 
may be found unconstitutional, should amend their statutes to 
exclude constitutional conduct and adequately define statutory 
terms that may be subject to vagueness challenges.168  In doing 
so, these states should look for guidance from other states whose 
similar statutes have passed constitutional muster.169  
Additionally, court decisions holding a given statute 
uconstitutional generally discuss the statute’s deficiencies; these 
discussions may also provide the states with helpful guidance in 
the amendment process.170 
CONCLUSION 
As Jane’s experience illustrates, advances in technology have 
expanded the ways in which stalkers can harass their victims, 
and this has blurred the distinctions between various stalking 
mediums.  While statutory law has similarly increased and 
developed in an attempt to accommodate stalking through newer 
mediums, existing laws remain subject to constitutional 
challenges and vary in the coverage afforded to stalking victims 
who have been stalked via the Internet and the phone.  Stalking 
victims are best protected by broad legislation that covers 
stalking by various means, including the Internet and the 
telephone, but that excludes otherwise constitutional conduct.  
Therefore, states should proactively amend their existing laws to 
 
mechanical or electronic means or otherwise with a person . . . by telephone . . . or by 
transmitting or delivering any other form of written communication . . . .”). 
 168 See supra note 161. 
 169 Statutes that have been found unconstitutional because they appear to criminalize 
constitutional conduct could be amended to include a proviso that they exclude 
constitutional conduct.  Alabama, for example, has narrowly tailored its harassment 
statute to pass constitutional review.  It defines “harasses” as: 
Engages in an intentional course of conduct directed at a specified person 
which alarms or annoys that person, or interferes with the freedom of 
movement of that person, and which serves no legitimate purpose.  The course 
of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer 
substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional 
distress.  Constitutionally protected conduct is not included within the 
definition of this term. 
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-92 (LexisNexis 2005).  Statutes that have been held 
unconstitutional for failure to define a particular word, such as Texas’ failure to define 
“repeated,” should look to states that have defined that term. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 42.07 (West 2003).  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111(4)(c)(IV) (West 2009) (defining 
“repeated” or “repeatedly” as “on more than one occasion”). 
 170 For example, Scott v. State held Texas’ harassment statute unconstitutional 
because of its “repeated calls” provision as well as for the statute’s failure to define the 
phrase “in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, 
embarrass, or offend another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07; Scott v. State 298 S.W.3d 
264, 269 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).  Therefore, Texas should amend its statute to include 
definitions for the words “repeated,” “alarm,” “embarrass,” and any similar terms. 
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withstand constitutional scrutiny and include expansive 
definitions for stalking through the mediums of the Internet and 
the telephone. 
